hierarchical structure of the Anglican Church the Revivalists encourage all to preach, heal, and embrace in brotherhood. Its followers advocate the burying of the dead with the playing of the gita and its songs rather than with the traditional ji tari. In June 1980, my uncle, Totoda, a former Anglican follower, who had been converted into the new movement died at Tabara. He was buried with gita songs and dance, the first time such a thing had been done in the history of my clan and the entire village. But my father and mother, who still follow the Anglican rituals, as well as others, mourned with the traditional ji tari.

I have shown how ji tari is adjusted to guru without disturbing the poetic components which consist of image, metre and repetition. The conversion of a ji tari to a guru is the work of a gifted poet as he or she takes the intensely felt emotion of a particular moment and makes it into art which contained definite rules strictly adhered to, by my grandparents’ generation. My father’s generation found the rules of the guru to be extremely difficult to follow and so the simplified kasamba was devised. Since guitar instruments and the accompanying songs introduced during this century became popular, the creation of new guru has declined. However, the young people will continue to pass on the guru of earlier generations.

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GROUP AND ETHNIC STEREOTYPY:
TOPICAL PREMISES ON A UNIVERSAL GROUND

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In stereotyping one another, human groups appear to be guided by a single, hence universal canon. Acknowledging tacit counterparts, groups everywhere identify each other by genus or category, differentiating as accepted counterparts, that is, the groups comprising a given category. Individual stereotypes emphasise differentiation, understandably, seldom the common principles that establish a category. Four such common or archetypal principles are recognised here as logically sufficient and arguably common to mankind, thus implicit in all of the many stereotypes so far recorded as well as in the much vaster number still unrecorded. Stereotypes of particular groups are one thing, of course; the specific criteria or diacritics, metaphors, and imagery locally invoked are another. The premises thus implied must be far less numerous and diverse than the stereotypes developed or derived from them. But even the number and diversity of basic premises remains to be charted. To this end, possible as well as known types of premises are listed. If universal principles underlie group stereotypy, recognising these principles should help order the further charting and comparison of its diverse local premises.

INTRODUCTION

This is an outsider’s essay. Ethnoscience is much closer to Ralph Bulmer’s expertise than to mine, and I cannot bring to it the knowledge and finesse he might have done. My approach to the identity of groups grew out of a study of relations among neighbouring peoples of the Kainantu area of Papua New Guinea. In facing the issue of what identity meant to these Kainantu neighbours I thus came indirectly to think in ethnoscience terms. In that one vicinity live well over a hundred erstwhile independent local groups. In countless overt and covert ways each Kainantu group closely resembles its neighbours. At the same time each as a people professes to be significantly distinct from others, a claim normally accepted on principle by others, even in the absence of specific knowledge. The otherness of other peoples is tacit. These facts led me to ask what premise or rationale underlay local identity and differentiation. What grounds were given each tiny local
group, none exceeding three or four hundred members and most of them far smaller, for believing in its own uniqueness? How was it unique, not only in its particular array of enemies and allies but, more to the immediate point, unique in the individual and collective attributes considered intrinsic to its people, the human qualities demonstrated in their past and anticipated in their posterity?

Except perhaps for their large number and the close packing of local territories, Kainantu peoples resemble the classic prototype sketched by Sumner (1906:12) in expounding his concept of “ethnocentrism”. In the skewing of their views of each other these peoples likewise tend to match his famous generalisation. But the ingroup/outgroup skewing Sumner emphasised has seemed to me less interesting or problematical than the terms in which so many small peoples, notwithstanding their proximity to one another and their recurrent fission, migration, merging, and assimilation, could profess and rationalise stable and enduring attributes distinctive of each people. Their possible uniqueness was not itself in question, in other words, but rather how, in these particular circumstances, uniqueness could be phrased or established, to what it might convincingly be attributed, and how it could be believed to endure. To such an inquiry Sumner’s theory of ethnocentrism forms only a backdrop. In asserting a difference between ingroup and outgroup, that is, ethnocentric views presuppose a common premise for comparison. The stress on an inevitable sociocentric bias, however, tends to make such local premises at best secondary or incidental. Here they are the foreground.

Following this path, I was led to reflect on local answers to “How are you as a people distinct from your neighbours and how are they distinct from each other?” (Watson and Watson 1972). To make a long story short, especially since this part of it is elsewhere told, I concluded that for Kainantu peoples identity has its premise in what I would later come to call a “Lamarckian” view of inheritance (Watson 1983:276-80; 1990:17-41). People are moulded and thereby differentiated by the different local auspices in which their maturation takes place. The common identity of those sharing the same auspices is accordingly established. The influence of an always unique proprietary landscape and that of certain historical antecedents are prominent among these auspices, as is the magical endowment conferred by those following whom and through whose competence succeeding members of the group, despite odds, have been made to grow and mature. This formulation of the Kainantu premise of identity is surely compatible with the frequent and rapid assimilation of immigrants, who are or in the past have been a significant part of many local populations. The most radical proof and hence expression of the Lamarckian premise, indeed, is probably to be found in the virtually complete indigenisation of immigrants even as early as the second generation.

The Lamarckian premise of Kainantu identity clearly differs radically from a racist premise – which for contrast might be styled “Mendelian”. If two such sharply different premises exist, it is reasonable to suppose that the world’s full range, if known, may be still wider.

Those acquainted with Ralph Bulmer’s major work will probably agree that he would readily have understood and could have enriched a discussion of this issue, whether or not accepting the particular views advanced here. The present disclaimer, however, is meant less to suggest hesitation or lack of conviction on my part than to bespeak the reader’s patience if earlier progress bearing on this case is inadvertently slighted, above all, if unwittingly, redundant spokes are fashioned here for the wheel of ethnoscience. I undertake such risks in writing this paper because its topic remembers Ralph Bulmer. It might have been his own.

A GALAXY OF GROUPS, ENDLESS STEREOTYPES,
BUT A SINGLE SET OF PRINCIPLES?

Groups abound. There is an unmistakable human propensity to perceive and objectify social discontinuities, as defined by the lines and terms of cooperation/competition. The ability evidently matches the need to stereotype the cooperating/competing personnels not only as groups distinct from one another but also as groups of one kind or another. In recognising only certain groups as one another’s counterparts, those concerned thus tacitly assign these counterparts to a certain genus. Groups and kinds of groups – genera – can be shaped and sharpened; they can be merged or split; and genera can be redefined by growth or attrition, above all by changing patterns of cooperation/competition. Subdividing or crossing along lines of association/dissociation, still newer membership sets emerge in the same manner. Sometimes overlapping, sometimes supplanting prior sets, new ingroups both reflect and are reflected in evolving stereotypes. As competing groups change in response to changing lines or terms of competition, in other words, the consequent realignment is abetted by, as well as abetting, the revision of ingroup and outgroup stereotypes.

In this expansive universe, myriad identities match and give contingent legitimacy to a multitude of groups. That each ingroup is identified uniquely both by itself and by various others, if nothing else, is a testament to the exuberance of cultural possibility as well as to the sorting skill and imaging finesse of cultured beings. (To be sure, no single set of cultured beings – apart from observers – need deal with more than a tiny fraction of this sociographic plethora.) As a result the world proliferates evolved or evolving ingroups and evolving ingroup and outgroup stereotypes. For ethnographers the emergence of new groups and stereotypes has been
a lively inquiry. Their industry notwithstanding, an exhaustive census of humanity’s ingroups is almost
certainly beyond reach and fortunately perhaps beyond practical need, a universe not only vast but ever in flux.
More daunting still than the number of groups would be a tally of the stereotyped identities coincident with
these myriad groups. Adding outgroup to ingroup stereotypes, that is, would yield not only further
complexity but a total of a stereotypes greater than the number of groups themselves.

Notwithstanding this proliferation, a single common logic may everywhere inform the stereotyping of
groups, guiding the distinctions made between one genus and another as well as the differentiation of groups
within a given genus. I suggest that a single canon can be recognised as embracing the world’s vast array of
group stereotypes, a set of underlying principles that everywhere guide and inform the practice. In effect any
 stereotype or identity must follow, hence at least implicitly express certain principles of identification. The
members of Group A hold the members of Group B to be different from themselves. Yet they are comparable
— not as apples and oranges, so to speak, but as kinds of apples. With varying degrees of explicitness, the
members of Group B are taken to be the collective counterpart of Group A. In what respects, then, do the
apples differ? They are comparable, but how so? And how are they compared? What principles underlie their
identification, either by themselves or by others?

Social group stereotypy, it seems to me, posits at a minimum the (1) unity, (2) singularity, and (3)
continuity of any group or community included in (4) some category or genus of social groups that, whether
stated or tacit, are seen as each other’s counterparts. Genera can be illustrated by local groups as distinct from
families or clans, say, and these in turn from other personnel sets coexisting in given societies, whether simple
or complex. The premise of stereotypy, in other words, must suppose individual groups each comprising
members collectively marked and set apart by shared attributes from the members of other known groups of
the given genus. These shared and distinctive attributes will have some recognised and perhaps rationalised
 persistence or stability.

Are the principles of identification ever explicit in their parochial expression? Explicitness (e.g., named
genera — “nation”, “clan”, etc.) seems to vary from one local set of stereotypes to another — a point surely
worth pursuing. If in some local stereotypes the principles are only tacit, in others — like modern racist
 stereotypes, for example — the principles may lie close to the surface and thus perhaps be widely rationalised.
How differences of racial inheritance give unity, singularity, and continuity to the groups so differentiated, in
other words, even in folk terms, can be quite explicit. Explicitness aside, in how many distinct ways can the
unity, singularity, and continuity of collectivities be configured or projected? With what degrees of latitude
can unity/singularity/continuity be asserted? How diverse, in short, are the distinct local expressions or criteria
of identification? By this I mean the diacritics used in stating local identities wherever these are found among
the world’s ingroups; or, if one must limit the field, those found among ingroups like those of Sumner’s
prototypes: small, territorially defined, and politically autonomous “local groups”. No estimate of the number
of different forms or styles of identification seems presently within reach. This must be admitted even though
— as already conceded — the distinct kinds of criteria used, such as racial ones, must be far fewer than distinct
identities. After all, much the same broad premise of unity/singularity/continuity can accommodate several
score or more of the local stereotypes of a single New Guinea vicinity (Watson and Watson 1972; J. Watson
1983; 1990:17-41). In many other vicinities as well a more or less uniform premise is generally shared among
those who reciprocally distinguish themselves.

In the modern if not the ancient world, on the other hand, there are spheres of competition wherein
ingroups, in reciprocally stereotyping each other, do not all have the same premises nor hence employ the
same criteria. Studies like those of Linnekin and Poyer (1990) deal with examples of just such spheres of
competition, spheres in which, as between indigenous and immigrant groups, stereotypy is or has been
discordantly premised. The erstwhile colonisers of the Third World often, if not always from the start,
proceeded from racist and/or evolutionary assumptions in stereotyping indigenous peoples. Meanwhile, the
premises of the latter sometimes differed radically from those of the colonisers. The disparity is apt to be
obscured in cases where the assignment of stereotypes — the ascription as opposed to the attributes ascribed
and their premises — supports on either hand much the same sociographic map. The juxtaposition of disparate
premises of identification within the same sphere of competition obviously raises important questions — for
instance, how one folk model influences, distorts, co-exists, merges with, or extinguishes another. Before
proceeding very far with the dynamics of discordant premises in reciprocal identification, however, it is
necessary first to recognise the general character of such models, how diverse they are, and in what ways they
diverge. Some folk models, for instance, may be much more flexible or resilient or in some other sense more
broadly serviceable than others. If so, then other models must in some complementary sense be less flexible,
more narrowly specialised — conceivably as a reflex of the forms of competition that have locally prevailed. In
what sense, where, and how folk models may be either broad or specialised are questions awaiting further
exploration.
WHAT PREMISES ARE OUT THERE?

If even the rough number of broadly different premises is for now unknown, what diversity they represent can only be guessed. Lacking a realistic inventory, one might start by conjecturing possible premises. Even the more easily imagined possibilities make a considerable list. The distinct identities of local groups might variously be attributed to somatic inheritance; early experience; pre- or post-natal environment – "environment", moreover, taken diversely as mates and mentors, as climate, as food, as magical auspices, or as land or landscape; breeding; bodily substance; training or education; and so on. These and other such possibilities, again, might occur either singly, one-by-one, or in some mix. Beyond their substantive diversity and the likelihood that premises of identification may fall into sub-classes lies a further question: the concomitants or implications of particular premises. How are specific premises related to specific identities – their imagery? How are they related to specific circumstances and settings of competition, to the presence of alternative premises, and withal to the dynamics of this interplay? While ethnocentric identification has been documented for decades (LeVine and Campbell 1972), the premises of identification do not seem to have received comparable attention. Racist premises appear to be the most famous exception to this rule.

DIFFERENT GENERA, DIFFERENT PREMISES

Before considering the variable terms in which unity, singularity, and continuity are ascribed to individual social groups, one must note again that more than one type or genus of social group is everywhere recognised. Any premise of identification not only (a) anticipates unique group identities, accordingly, but almost always (b) states or implies the generic properties of a particular set or genus to which these groups and identities belong, the genus within which they are each other's counterparts. In contrast to specific ingroup or outgroup identities, as ethnographers often record them, a premise of identification is inclusive, implying if not recognising the common ground for stereotyping groups of a given kind. It defines, so to speak, generic themes within which variation is known or presumed. Ethnology of course recognises a number of genera of social groups other than local groups, notably families, lineages, clans, phratries, moieties, and so on. (Indeed, in searching out the premises of identification for such internal segments, it is interesting to observe, ethnologists may have been more systematic on the whole than in doing so for the local groups such segments comprise.) In positing the generic features of recognised social groups of every sort, premises of identification can be likened to models, folk theories, cultural principles, or ethno-sociology. The New Guinea communities Ralph Bulmer knew represent but one kind of social group. Not every premise would equally well serve them in identifying themselves and each other. Political parties, internal factions, clubs, cliques, or organised interest groups, for example, may also develop ingroup/outgroup identities along Sumnerian lines, but premises sufficient for identifying such groups would scarcely serve for stereotyping New Guinea communities.

As social groups of different genera, to take the extreme case, cliques and local communities require radically different premises of identification. Consider the old saw, "Birds of a feather flock together". While poorly suited for stereotyping multigenerational New Guinea communities, Burton's familiar avian metaphor suggests a fine premise of identification, say, for many clubs, cliques, or networks. It captures the generic attributes of adult peer or reference groups drawn together, say, by common interest or a sense of kindred spirit or lifestyle. In such terms not only can certain "birds" be recognised as comprising a "flock", but as many flocks can in principle be identified as there are birds (here generic) of distinctive "plumage".Positing at once both the unity and the singularity of each such flock, the premise also presumes in each a certain continuity. In effect, as the analogy suggests, the premise of identification answers why each of a particular series or genus of groups is justified in identifying itself or in being identified in its own collective likeness relative to the comparable but distinct likenesses perceived in others of its kind, its presumed counterparts and competitors.

Among spatio-politically defined New Guinea communities in the Kainantu area (Watson 1983: 276-80), in contrast to the groups just described, identity is endogenous. It does not follow nor arise from recruiting or aggregating people who, previously formed, perhaps for diverse reasons happen to share tastes or temperament and the means and purpose to indulge them jointly. Unlike flocks, Kainantu communities see the identity of each local people not only as having common causes; they recognise the causes as being somehow intrinsic to the collectivity, its own history or estate. The collective identity, thus, is not the outcome of a secondary, post-hoc association of members already – that is, extraneously or incidentally – marked. If not eternal, moreover, the collective identity of a local Kainantu society is at least trans-generational. In every case the means and legacy that marked their elders are thought to mark a succeeding generation, at least if they reside among these elders. The range of premises suitable for stereotyping local New Guinea societies (and probably many others broadly like them) will thus reflect generic conditions quite distinct from those of Burton's flocks.
Generic suitability, however, by no means reduces possible premises of identification to a single, ubiquitous set. As the contrast between Lamarckian and Mendelian premises seems to suggest, local terms of identification are not replicated everywhere among the social groups to which ethnology traditionally assigns a single, "cross-cultural" label, e.g., "local groups," "clans," "cliques," and so forth. Here no less than elsewhere in comparing societies the broader, "emic/etic," question arises. Comparativists must be aware of their problem in considering as intersocietally "the same" genera whose respective local premises of identification (as well as the social environments therein reflected) are known to vary. While the sources or causes of unity, singularity, and continuity are of unknown diversity, it is clear that these terms may differ radically from the premise of one locality to that of another. Turning once more to the extremes already noted, there is surely a radical difference of terms between (1) innatist premises and (2) environmentalist ones. Innatism posits a social group whose unity, singularity, and continuity probably arise on account of the inborn spiritual inheritance or somatic pedigree its members purportedly share. An environmentalist premise, on the other hand, presumably anticipates a unity, singularity, and continuity based on some kind of durable external influence commonly but uniquely affecting those who claim it as the source of their own or, as the case may be, some other people's identity. In certain if not in all innatist terms, on the one hand, continuity is not only intergenerational but the connection between progenitors and progeny is in principle unbreakable. In environmentalist terms, on the other hand, intergenerational continuity might have a different implication for parents, children, and succeeding progeny, depending on whether all alike have been subject to the same or different critical influences.

Innatist/environmentalist is a very broad distinction, to be sure, and for purposes of discussion here it is quite roughly drawn. On either hand there is room for more specific terms in which unity/singularity/continuity may variably be locally found configured. As is doubtless already plain, I am construing "innatist" to mean that unity and singularity are continuously - intergenerationally - encoded. Encoding is perhaps a part of conception; it is at least established by the time of any group member's birth and it comes about through the direct physical or biological involvement of particular parents or antecedents-in-common. Innatist unity, singularity, and continuity thus are relatively inaccessible to subsequent contingencies. Accordingly, offspring may be directly and substantively connected with either or both parents; or their connection may instead involve the same (e.g., spiritual or totemic) progenitor(s); or it may depend on some third antecedent individual, category, or stock. On the other hand, I take "environmentalist" premises to mean that unity and singularity are contingent upon and encode locally variable influences. Such influences may well be cumulative, in which case a more prolonged "exposure" may mark some of those so influenced more than others. Environmentalist premises may refer to the marking of individuals prior to birth, but quite likely, as in the case of Kainantu, they focus especially on influences occurring after birth and during maturation. Continuity thus presupposes and reflects locally unique influences, as manifest in those who, by location and whether thanks to birth or not, are collectively subject to and marked by given influences.

CONCLUSIONS

I have argued that unity, singularity, and continuity at a minimum must somehow be accounted for in stereotyping social groups (a) according to kind or genus and (b) as distinctive representatives of a particular genus. With such a starting point, one might conceivably attempt to predict all possible premises that would satisfactorily match imaginable and serviceable human meanings to the generic niches presupposed by social stereotypy. Such a task may well seem visionary and beyond reach. Even so, it suggests at least how much terrain may exist to be charted. With neither a full record nor a satisfactory hypothetical charting, in any case, there remains the investigation of specific, recognisable premises of identification as these are found embedded in the stereotypes of mankind's myriad ingroups. If the notion of universal principles of identification holds up, it should be helpful in carrying forth this task. As far as possible, there should be some assessment of the adaptive possibilities and limitations of given premises.

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