DEVELOPMENT POLYNESIAN STYLE: CONTEMPORARY FUTUNAN SOCIAL ECONOMY AND ITS CULTURAL FEATURES

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The people are not usually resisting the technologies and ‘conveniences’ of modernization, nor are they particularly shy of the capitalist relations needed to acquire them. Rather, what they are after is the indigenization of modernity, their own cultural space in the global scheme of things. (Sahlins 1999:410).

This article deals with the contemporary social and political economy of the island of Futuna, which is part of a French overseas territory in Western Polynesia. Little has been published on contemporary Futunan society over the last 70 years. After some historical and demographic background, the intricacies of Futunan social and political organisation as well as forms of economic co-operation are discussed, followed by theoretical reflections on subsistence, barter and gift economy. Within the wider socio-political setting of the island, Futunans negotiate their transactions of daily life as participants in a world where French capital plays a significant role. A major point highlighted in this article is the cultural and social embeddedness of the economy, both “traditional” and “modern”, within the particular Futunan configuration.

LEGACIES OF THE COLONAL AND CUSTOMARY PAST

In the past, there have been several moments and periods of contacts between Futunans and Samoans, Tongans, other Pacific islanders and Europeans.¹ With regard to the last, the Dutch sailor Schouten and the merchant Le Maire with the crew of the Eendracht “discovered” Futuna in 1616. They gave Futuna and neighbouring Alofi the name Horn Islands (Hoorn-Eilanden). The name figured on European maps for centuries, but in contrast to the European name Wallis for the island of ‘Uvea, it did not survive.² In 1801, the British captain W. Wilson of the Royal Admiral cast anchor in the bay of Sigave, at the time still known as Schouten’s Bay. These visits, like similar visits to the island by whalers and sandalwood traders, were incidental, but other European interventions were of greater consequence. In 1837, the French Roman Catholic Bishop sent several missionaries to the
Within a few decades, they were able to establish Roman Catholicism as a single church on both Wallis and Futuna. This situation has been characterised as one of “theocracy”, although missionary colonisation may be more appropriate—missionarocracy not being a euphonic construct. At the insistence of the Roman Catholic missionaries, Futuna obtained the political status of French Protectorate in 1887, and in 1961 it became a French Overseas Territory (Territoire d’Outre-Mer). With this legal act, the link between Futuna and the island of Wallis, 230 km distant (with a population of about 9,000, or nearly twice Futuna’s population of 4,600 in 1996; source: Cherri at al. 1997:4), originally imposed by these various European outsiders, became a political and administrative fact. However, the two islands are home to two distinct Polynesian societies with different cultures (Burrows 1936, 1937).

At present, Futuna is still part of the French Overseas Territory of Wallis-and-Futuna, a sort of French variant of the status of American Sāmoa vis-à-vis the United States (since 1900 an unincorporated territory). A typically Polynesian political-juridical system of chieftaincy prevails on both islands (Feinberg and Watson-Gegeo 1996, Goldman 1970, Sahlins 1958, White and Lindstrom 1997), but the people of Wallis and Futuna also participate in a parliamentary political system, and there are in place both a form of French administration of justice (droit commun) and a customary Futunan system of justice (droit coutumier) (Aimot 1995, Trouilhet-Tamole and Simete 1995).

At the end of the 19th century, the Roman Catholic mission introduced a constitution prohibiting, among other matters, the sale of land, the latter at the explicit insistence of the chiefs. Futunan kin groups and chiefs still exclusively control land tenure, and on Futuna (and Wallis) no land-register exists. The French administration tries to maintain control over the indigenous political system through annual grants to the two chiefdoms in Futuna, Sigave and Alo (under the label circonscriptions), as well as through monthly allowances to individual paramount chiefs, high chiefs, and village chiefs.

The island economy combines different forms of production and social relations: subsistence production, barter-relationships and gift exchange (see below). As well, a French oriented (and protected) form of capitalist production operates, although the development of the capitalist economy is substantially constrained by the prohibition on the sale of land in Futuna. Private ownership of the means of production is one of the basic characteristics of capitalism—other major characteristics being commodity production, the use of the means of production and money to produce surplus value, and the accumulation of capital through the exploitation of labour.

Nevertheless, the economic orientation of Futuna is rapidly changing. French influence is increasing and a growing number of Futunans receive salaries from the French Government, which leads to a growing middle class and the
Figure 1. Map of Futuna and (on inset) Alofi (source: Guiot 2000:21).
development of consumerism. For example, Mateasi Takasi, an 81 years-old farmer, told me that, as a young man, he participated in a co-operative that exported copra to New Caledonia and Vanuatu. In addition, he earned money by collecting trochose shell; his household consumed the flesh of the snails while he sold the shells to a visiting dealer from New Caledonia. At that time, there was also some small-scale commercial cultivation of cocoa. In the 1950s, all this came to an end. Mateasi Takasi also remembered that tinned fish, corned beef and deep-frozen chicken were not then part of daily meals. Except for deep-frozen chicken, these import products were already available for purchase, but most Futunans did not have the money to buy them (pers. comm. 2001). Nowadays, money—also in its invisible and intangible forms (bank credit, for example) is becoming increasingly important on Futuna, both within and outside the local subsistence, barter and gift economy.

My anthropological perspective on the social economy of Futunan society departs from the assumption made by Polanyi and others (Dupuy 2001; Godelier 1984, 1996, 2000; Gregory 1982; Polanyi 1957) that economic relations are embedded in the wider whole of a society and its culture. On Futuna, the embeddedness of the economy relates to both kinship and chieftaincy. The original (“traditional”) Futunan economy consisted not only of subsistence production or gift exchange (and thus cannot simply be identified as “subsistence economy” or “gift economy”) but was a combination, or a configuration, of subsistence, barter and gift dimensions. In contemporary times, this combination of subsistence, barter and gift dimensions no longer exists in its isolated (“traditional”) form, but is combined—or re-configured—with a market economy or, to be more precise, with some aspects of capitalism. We can see here a parallel with the political system that is a historical mixture of customary chieftaincy and a Western system of power (e.g., parliamentary democracy). Thus, in the original Futunan social and political economy, the relations of production, distribution and power corresponded with and were orchestrated by both the kinship system and the overlapping hierarchy of chiefly relationships.

These insights provide the background for the issues I will address in the remainder of this article, which is, as far as I know, the first anthropological publication in English on Futunan society since the pioneering work by Burrows (1936). My aim is to elucidate the nature of the contemporary Futunan social economy and what its specific cultural features are by, among other things, analysing different forms of co-operation in agricultural production. I begin by evaluating some figures.
THE ACTIVE POPULATION IN DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE

At the time of the last census, in 1996, Futuna had 4,638 inhabitants, one-third of the total population of the territory of Wallis and Futuna (Cherri et al. 1997:4). These figures do not include the many Wallisians and Futunans who live in New Caledonia, another French overseas territory. At the end of the 1960s, Wallisians and Futunans emigrated there in order to work in the booming nickel industry, with the result that in 1976 slightly more Wallisians and Futunans lived in New Caledonia than on their home islands. A dip in the New Caledonian economic growth (the nickel crisis) and the independence of Vanuatu (that also had a significant Wallisian and Futunan diaspora) led to the return of some of these emigrants in the early 1980s. Since then, emigration has again accelerated, in particular among youths (18-25 years). In 1996, 25 percent more Wallisians and Futunans (17,763) were living in New Caledonia than those (14,166) on their home islands (Cherri et al. 1997:6). This emigration explains the weak demographic growth since the previous census in 1990: +3.4 percent for Wallis and Futuna together, but only +1 percent in the Futunan Alo district, and even -6.7 percent in the Futunan Sigave district (Cherri et al. 1997:5). The slow growth and recent reduction of the Sigave population shows the impact of continued emigration, probably mostly for educational and economic reasons. A severe earthquake in 1992 and several tropical cyclones on Futuna may also be contributing factors (see Table 1).

Virtually every person living on Wallis and Futuna has French nationality, except 0.3 percent of the population. In 1996, 4.2 percent were French metropolitan natives or people born in French overseas departments or territories. Most of these people live on Wallis, the administrative and educational centre of the territory. In Futuna, 89 percent of the population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Alo</th>
<th>Sigave</th>
<th>Total Futuna</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>2,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1,784</td>
<td>1,389</td>
<td>3,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2,477</td>
<td>1,847</td>
<td>4,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2,860</td>
<td>1,872</td>
<td>4,732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2,892</td>
<td>1,746</td>
<td>4,638</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Futunan population growth (source: Cherri et al. 1997:5).
was born on the island and the majority of the remaining 11 percent are children of Futunan emigrants to New Caledonia (Cherri et al. 1997:12). These figures are drawn from the 1996 census, and the demographers and statisticians involved attribute the low immigration by French metropolitans and the almost complete absence of immigrants with other nationalities to the “low economic development” of the territory (Cherri et al. 1997:12). I interpret the expression “low economic development” as a form of formalist (economic) reductionism and suggest that the more likely explanatory factors for these low figures are the relative isolation of the islands and the prohibition on selling land.

Economists usually formulate (deductive) hypotheses based on figures. On Futuna, such figures are made available by means of the census. Knowing that Futuna with its 4,638 inhabitants has a predominantly agricultural economy, the following census figures are, at the very least, surprising. They count the “professionally active part” of the population of 14 years and older (see Table 2).

Table 2: Professionally active part of the Futunan population (source: Cherri et al. 1997:29; italicised figures are subtotals).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal professions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisans, shop-keepers, entrepreneurs</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Independent professionals</em></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Family aid</em></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work at home</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apprentices</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary contracts private sector</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenured contracts private sector</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Salaried persons private sector</em></td>
<td>85</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary contracts public sector</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenured contracts public sector</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Salaried persons public sector</em></td>
<td>186</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL of subtotals</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Statistics alone, although often helpful and sometimes necessary, never truly represent a society, but have to be explained. Table 2 shows that in this predominantly agricultural society of more than 4,000 people, only two persons are categorised as farmers. How do the census statisticians and demographers account for this paradox? In the following explanation, they supply an answer to this question.

Only agricultural activity with a commercial aim is accounted for in the census. Persons categorised as active in the census are those who are engaged in an activity in what is usually called the formal sector. It is difficult to apply the census criteria concerning activity to a traditional environment that obeys its own policy and does not follow the laws of the market. This induced the census agents to categorise as inactive those persons of working age who are engaged in a traditional activity. (Cherri et al. 1997:20; translation from the French by the author).

With this explanation, the census makers confound themselves. They recognise that most people of working age are engaged in an economic activity, roughly indicated as “traditional”, but declare themselves to be unable to account for this in the results of their research, i.e., their quantitative data. In those instances where they do make an effort to be more precise and specify “traditional” activities in terms of “cultivation of food crops, pig breeding, [and] fishing” (Cherri et al. 1997:20), they omit mentioning that these activities are gender specific and hence cannot be ascribed to (almost) all people active in what they prefer to call the “informal” sector (see also Desrosières and Thévenot 1996). On Futuna, cultivating food crops and breeding pigs are male activities (ga’oi tagata), as is fishing in the open sea. Fishing and gathering seafood on the surrounding reef, however, is women’s work (ga’oi fafine) along with cultivating paper mulberry trees (Broussonetia papyrifera, for tapa) and making mats and tapa. Also the statement that “this [traditional] activity [i.e., the cultivation of food crops, pig breeding, and fishing] is almost entirely focused on the subsistence of the households” (Cherri et al. 1997:20) is incorrect, since a significant portion of the food crops, taro in particular and practically all pigs, are destined for gifting outside the household. The explanatory statement immediately following that “other customary activities concern the maintenance of collective facilities in villages and are usually practiced intermittently” (Cherri et al. 1997:20) may be correct, but is not very clear about what these collective facilities are. My general point is that most Futunans and their activities disappear behind these formalist economic, demographic and statistical models; people become invisible as actors in economic processes. In light of my critical remarks regarding this census material, I aim to provide a fuller understanding of the
Futunan social economy through a qualitative, non-formalist approach; this approach does not exclude quantitative elements and several census figures will be included in the analysis.

OVERLAPPING CIRCLES OF SOCIAL ORGANISATION

I suggest that the socioeconomic and political organisation on Futuna may be understood in terms of four concentric and overlapping circles: (i) the chiefdom, (ii) the village, (iii) the extended family localised on a shared ground (kāiga), and (iv) the household. This perspective implies that Futunan society cannot be understood or explained in terms of villages and households alone, as the census enumerators do. Moreover, an analysis of Futuna’s socioeconomic and political organisation in terms of concentric circles alone would be incomplete. Important aspects of this organisation—in particular with respect to the circulation of gifts and the transmission of titles—concern (v) the non-localised or dispersed cognatic kin group and (vi) the descent group from one or several common ancestors. In this section, I will describe these six principles of organisation.

Chiefdom

Futuna has two chiefdoms (pule ‘aga sau), Sigave in the west and Alo in the east. These are chiefly federations governed by two paramount chiefs (sau), the Tu’i Sigave and the Tu’i Agaifo respectively. These two paramount chiefs, symbolically considered ‘flags’ (manumanu) of their chiefdoms (Favole 2000a:216), are each assisted by a council consisting of high chiefs (aliki lasi). These councils (fono lasi) are responsible for affairs of common interest, such as the organisation of large public gift ceremonies (katoaga), and they function as tribunals. Fines are paid in the form of pigs and mats or, in the case of young persons, corvée labour. Every major village on the south and west shore has a titled high chief (aliki lasi) as well as two titled village heads (aliki pule kolo), one of whom, along with the high chief, is responsible for the corresponding village or hamlet on the north shore.10

Village

On Futuna, there are 15 villages (kolo), mainly concentrated on the south and west shores, nine villages belonging to the Alo and six to the Sigave district (see Table 3).11

The village heads implement the chiefs’ decisions concerning general rules (lao, after the English word “law”) or development projects through the village council (fono fakafenua), which consists of old men (matu’ā). The chiefs supervise this implementation at local level. It is a chief’s task to
incite his people to grow crops, feed pigs, make *tapa* (barkcloth) and weave mats so that, when he appeals to them for social duties (*fatogia*), they will be able to respond positively. For example, when a new village meeting house (*fale fono*) has to be built, the chief may request a number of localised *kāiga* to make an earth oven (*ʻumu*) for three days in order to feed the workers. Moreover, village heads and chiefs play a mediating role in land conflicts. When two families dispute the boundaries between their land and are unable to agree, they apply to the village head. The latter takes advice from old men who may know about the extent and history of the boundaries. If the matter appears to be too complex, however, the village head refers to the chief and the latter may, in turn, refer to the council of chiefs.

*Localised kāiga*

The notion of *kāiga* indicates both a plot of village land as well as the kin group living on it. One or more related households reside on a shared ground (*kāiga*). The village of Ono, for example, has 23 *kāiga*, which occupy adjacent sections, each extending from the beach at the south to the stone wall—“pig wall”—that marks the slope of the mountains at the north. The rights to reside on, and cultivate *kāiga* land are transmitted cognatically (i.e., one has the choice between father’s and mother’s side), but in practice there is a slight preference towards the paternal side. In 1989, during my first genealogical survey on 125 shared grounds (*kāiga*) in different villages in the chiefdom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taoa</td>
<td>724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mala’e</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ono</td>
<td>709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolia</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vele</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poi</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamana</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuatafa</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alofi</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Alo district</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,892</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leava</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuku</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaisei</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiua</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toloke</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tavai</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Sigave district</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,746</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Village populations in the Alo and Sigave districts (source: Cherri *et al.* 1997:5).
of Alo, rights to 76 kāiga (60.8 percent) were inherited via the father and 49 (39.2 percent) via the mother. When the inheritance of two preceding generations is taken into account, we obtain the following result (see Table 4), which shows a clear tendency towards patrilinear inheritance.

For every localised kāiga there is a person, the pule kāiga (pule means authority), responsible for its affairs—in the past this used to be always a man but more recently there are a few women fulfilling this role. For example, the pule kāiga brings together the extended family to ask their permission to build a new house on the kāiga land for a recently married couple. The pule kāiga is also the person whom the chief contacts to fulfil social obligations (fatogia) that will be undertaken by all kāiga members. Between the households in the same kāiga, intensive exchange (barter) and gift circulation occurs.

**Household**

A Futunan household is localised in a house (fale) and usually consists of a man and a woman with their children (fänauga), which may be augmented by other close and less close kin. According to the last census (1996), the average Futunan household comprised 5.6 persons. Compared to the number of 6.2 persons in 1990 (cherri et al. 1997:35), this is a rapid reduction of the average household size. Food for the household is provided by all members: it consists of products of the father’s and/or elder sons’ labours (ga‘oi tagata) in agriculture or open sea fishing (see also Di Piazza, Frimigacci and Keletaona 1991); women and daughters supply other products of the sea by fishing on the fringing reef. In addition, women give birth and care for children (soli le ma‘uli ki le fanau) typical female work (ga‘oi fafine) is also the production of mats and tapa which are both used domestically and in gift exchange. Members of both sexes may look after and feed pigs, although within gift ceremonies pigs are considered as male items.

**Dispersed kāiga**

The kāiga in the sense of a dispersed cognatic kin group or extended family is mainly activated during life crises such as birth, marriage and death.
This activation is materialised in a periodic physical presence of all käiga members in one place and intensive gift circulation at the käiga ground or at other locations (church, cemetery). During a wedding, for example, the käiga of both partners, the käiga tagata and the käiga fafine, participate in gifting. The gifts of both käiga may be distinguished (see Table 5) in food (kai) and non-food prestige goods (koloa), which are, within all käiga, gender related.

### Descent group

The cognatic kin group called käiga overlaps with the kütuga, but should be analytically distinguished from it. Kütuga membership is defined by descent from one or several common ancestors. The titles (launiu) of paramount chief (sau), high chief (aliki) and village head (pule kolo), and their associated authority and privileges (the mana-tapu complex), are inherited within chiefly descent groups (kütuga aliki) or, to use Firth’s (1957) term, rąmages.14 As a rule, the genealogical knowledge of people belonging to chiefly families (aliki) is much more profound than those of other families (seka) or commoners.15 The inhabitants of a village, whether or not they belong to a chiefly family, are the kakai of the high village chief (aliki lasi). The oldest man of a kütuga (or käiga in this sense) is the 'ulumatu’a. He acts as mediator in family disputes that are seen to be the cause of sickness and need to be resolved in family meetings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food gifts (kai)</th>
<th>Non-food gifts (koloa)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Produced and presented by men</td>
<td>Produced and presented by women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigs (puaka)</td>
<td>Bark cloth (siapo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yams ('ufi)</td>
<td>Mats (moe aga)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taro (talo)</td>
<td>Turmeric (ama)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giant taro (kape)</td>
<td>Tobacco (fatapaka) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish (ika) **</td>
<td>Perfumed coconut oil (fagu lolo) ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These are locally cultivated, dried and compressed tobacco leaves.
** And other food such as lobster (‘ula), crayfish (‘ula’ula), breadfruit (mei), and various kinds of bananas.
*** The coconut oil is perfumed with flowers, fruits, nuts, bark, or roots.
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGE

The six principles of socioeconomic and political organisation as distinguished in the previous section have undergone major changes, as described in the following examples. One and a half centuries ago, the Roman Catholic missionaries superimposed their colonial-religious roster on the two chiefdoms. The boundaries of the two parishes (palokia) on Futuna correspond exactly with the boundaries of the chiefdoms of Sigave and Alo. In the past, Sigave and Alo were frequently at war. A missionary effort in 1842 to unite both districts was not successful. For practical reasons, especially accessibility by sea, the colonial administration and the commerce centre were established in Sigave. This is still a cause of frustration in Alo. Given that the early inhabitants of Alo were in the main the victorious party in wars of the past certainly plays a part in this hurt pride. Michel Panoff (1970:154) also remarked that Futuna had two “autonomous and rivaling” districts. The largest manifestations of gift circulation, katoaga, are organised by a chiefdom or parish and hardly ever by the island as a whole, even if such a feast is given in honour of the Roman Catholic bishop or of a visiting French minister of state. The most usual food distribution feasts (katoaga) coincide with village patron saints’ feasts, in which the island of Alofi also counts as a village—it indeed has its own chief (aliki). During such elaborate feasts, each household (fale) gives a pig, a basket with root crops, a mat and a tapa.

Since 1985, the religious monopoly of the Roman Catholic church has been broken by a protestant denomination known as the Evangelical Church (Église évangélique). It was introduced by a charismatic young man, Sepeli Tuikalepa, who was converted in Lyon, France, where he had studied at University. In 1989, the Evangelical Church had approximately 100 followers (of these about 40 adults belonged to about 20 households; Emelita Iva, pers. comm. 1989), and in 2001 there were about 200 followers (chief Sa’atula, a.k.a. Setefano Takaniko, pers. com.). Most members of this Church reside in the villages of Ono and Kolia, a few in Malae’e, but none in the Sigave district. Apart from strictly theological aspects—which are beyond the focus of the present article, but not unrelated to them—the members of the Evangelical Church take an explicit stance against the chiefs, who co-operate with the Roman Catholic Church, as well as against massive gift-giving feasts (katoaga), which do not correspond with their own ideals of modesty and austerity. For these reasons, they refuse to attend village councils. In 2000, however, to inaugurate their Futunan bible translation they invited the paramount and other high chiefs to an exceptional katoaga. The chiefs pondered whether to accept the invitation, because the Evangelical Church members were dissidents vis-à-vis their chieftaincy. In the end, the chiefs went to the katoaga and delivered the following message in a speech.
You are not obliged to come to our village meetings where we take decisions about the organisation of religious events, because these do not concern you any longer. However, we insist that you come to the meetings about village matters, such as village sanitation and other development projects. Religion [lotu] and custom [tofiga] should not be confused (Sa‘atula, pers. comm. 2001).

The admonition not to confuse religion and custom is particularly interesting, because for over the last one and a half centuries Futunan chiefs have been very much involved in this confusion themselves. During a large feast (katoaga), all chiefs of the chiefdom are present and, in the distribution of the food and other gifts (pigs, taro, tapa, mats, etc.), they receive a portion on behalf of their respective villages. When the chiefs decide to organise a katoaga, they call for all men to make a contribution (fatogia tagata) in the form of baked food. In the past, only those who were circumcised were considered men (tagata). In the present time, boys around 16 years of age are still circumcised (in the hospital), but the fatogia tagata depends on the boy’s school attendance. An 18-year-old student may be exempt from fatogia, but a 14-year-old boy who does not attend school but works on the land is not. The upper limit of male retirement on Futuna is 55 years, when one is considered to be an old man (matu’a) and participates in important decisions in the exclusively male village council. The typically male and female gifts in the form of food (kai) and non-food prestige goods (koloa) respectively (listed in Table 5) are now distinguished (as koloa fakafutuna) from imported, commercial wedding gifts (koloa fakapapālagi), such as refrigerators and washing machines.

At present, the household differs from the situation described by Burrows: “The biological family, comprising parents and their children, is not clearly recognized as a unit in Futunan thought”. Although it is still true that “the language has no term for this group”, as Burrows (1936:76) noted, we may now distinguish it as a circle in our model of concentric social organisation. With respect to this circle, special mention should be made of adolescent boys who, out of respect (fakapoipoi) are not supposed to sleep under the same roof as their sisters and who therefore sleep until marriage in a special boys’ house (fale uvō). However, there remains only one boys’ house in every village in the chiefdom of Alo and none in Sigave. In modern, concrete houses there are separate rooms and the cultural necessity to send sons (in particular the eldest) to the boys’ house at night has become unnecessary. At the time of Burrows’ fieldwork in the early 1930s, the kāiga still coincided with the household, i.e., the group of people who ate together on a daily basis. Burrows (1936:77, 1939:10) suggested that the word kāiga derives from kai, i.e. both the noun ‘food’ and the verb ‘to eat’, and -ga, a suffix of action, although this etymology is now questioned, given long and short vowels. In some cases
the eating together of kāiga (localised kin group) members still holds true, but with demographic expansion, a growing focus on the nuclear family and a general tendency towards individualism, today usually every house (fale) contains a separate household that also has its own roof for sheltering the earth oven (fai 'umu), a kitchen roof (fale kuka) and a toilet (fale vao, literally: ‘bush house’, implying the non-existence of such ‘houses’ in the past). In concrete houses which are becoming more common, the kitchen and toilet are integrated. The kāiga in this sense is still a “residential kindred” (Panoff 1970:170), but no longer a daily eating group or household. However, the kāiga in the sense of shared ground still retains the particular identity of a homestead with its own name. These names may be equated to the use of house numbers: one name for each small group of related households.

Today, Futunans distinguish between two kinds of work: work for money (ga’oi pa’aga) and work for subsistence, barter and gift exchange that excludes the exchange of money (ga’oi kele). Most adult Futunans are Polynesian subsistence farmers-fishermen or women who do some fishing, take care of their children and make mats and tapa. They participate actively as well as passively in gift circulation, but also have a growing, though still modest, need for cash, for example to supply their households with clothing, sugar and cocoa, i.e., imported commercial products. The money earned at the margin of their subsistence activities, however, is re-invested mostly in the gift circulation, for example, gifts of money to the chiefs and to the church. From an anthropological perspective, this situation is typical, because a transition towards a monetary economy does not necessarily imply a weakening of gift circulation, as economists so often incorrectly presuppose (see Van der Grijp 1999, 2004). As we have seen in the debate on the trader’s dilemma (Evers and Schrader 1994, Van der Grijp 2003), however, within a Polynesian context, a decreasing participation in gift circulation is a logical precondition for the development of a Western-style (or capitalist) entrepreneurship.

In the following section, I will discuss four contemporary forms of agriculture related co-operation or co-operatives in order to demonstrate that development projects initiated by the participants themselves are more sustainable than the ones initiated from above (chieftaincy) or outside (France).

SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN AGRICULTURE-RELATED COOPERATION

The first co-operatives I discuss are transportation co-operatives or sosiete vaka. They only exist on Futuna (not on Wallis Island) and there only in the Alo district. Only the inhabitants of the Alo district have agricultural land on the neighbouring island of Alofi and need transportation to get there. On Futuna (land area 64 km²) there are several fresh water sources, but on Alofi
there are hardly any. Because of this, people do not reside in Alofi, yet it remains an important agricultural and fishing area.

The Futunan word sosiete derives from the French société (society) and refers to an organisation or co-operative (kautasi) of a small group of persons from the same village (usually about 10 to 20, mostly men, but including women). They may finance a motor boat (vaka) in order to facilitate the crossing of the 2km-wide canal between the Futunan beach known as Vele and the island of Alofi. The sosiete motoka (after the English word “motor car”) is a variant and indicates the collective purchase of a small open truck for transport between the village and Vele, from where a trip is continued by boat. Also, the Futunan airstrip is adjacent to the village of Vele and the major access points to fishing grounds are in the Vele area. The funds for the purchases were raised through fairs (kermesses) where money was donated in exchange for food and public dances. Here too, we can see how economic transactions are still integrated in gift circulation and can hence only be understood in these terms. The designation of a transport co-operative, sosiete vaka or sosiete motoka, indicates whether it runs a boat or a truck or, if both, which people want to emphasise. In the past, farmers walked from their village to Vele and returned with the harvest on their backs. The crossing of the channel was made with an outrigger canoe—often borrowed. Recently, the roads on Futuna have been improved, particularly the ring road around the island. This together with an increasing participation in the monetary economy (globalisation) and the financial incapacity to buy a car or motor boat individually all contributed to the founding of the co-operatives.

In Kolia and Ono, these kinds of co-operatives were already founded in 1977, one in each village, but the figure in 2001 dates only from 1998. In 2001, there were three sosiete in Kolia, four in Ono (three in Ono-Alo and one in Tamana), one in Malae, and four in Taoa (three in Taoa-Alo and one in Kalavele). Most co-operatives are a combination of sosiete vaka and sosiete motoka, except the one in Vele where there is only a boat, and in Taoa that only runs trucks because people have no agricultural land on Alofi, but only in Fikavi and Tuatava. There are also mutual arrangements, such as the one between the villages of Poi and Tamana, who pick up each other’s people by truck or by boat. At the end of the month, the members of a co-operative pay a contribution towards petrol. Not all villagers are members of these co-operatives. The chiefs are members as farmers, not necessarily as organisers, although at least one of them, the Sa’atula (the chief of Malae), is active in placing orders for trucks and outboard motors in Fiji through his personal network.

A second form of co-operative is the one founded in 1990 in the village of Ono, in response to the construction of a market hall built with financial
aid from the French state. A market co-operative (sosiete maketi) was founded after the model of the sosiete vaka, i.e., a group of persons who pay a contribution and choose among their members a president, secretary and treasurer in charge of running the market. Sixty members joined the sosiete maketi. The market was held one Sunday morning each month (there were insufficient goods available for a weekly market). On offer for sale were agricultural products (taro, yams, coconuts, manioc, breadfruit) and fish. In addition, food baked in the earth oven (ʻumu) was for sale, which proved to be the most popular product because it could be consumed immediately after Sunday morning mass. Market sales were not subject to taxes, since people sold their own produce. Manufactured products such as mats and tapa were not sold on this (local) market but in separate fale (discussed below).

This Futunan market, however, encountered problems similar to those a comparable market encountered on Wallis: management, the small range and quantity of products on offer, people’s weak purchasing power, and the cultural notion of shame (mātaga fua) that is attached to selling or buying agricultural produce in public (Van der Grijp 2002). For Futunans displaying agricultural products for sale signifies that one’s household is poor, and buying this kind of produce at a market implies that one does not work enough on the land oneself and hence does not fit the cultural norm. After six months, the market declined and as an experiment of a market exchange might now be considered a failure.

A third form of co-operation is when many women work together in the production of handicraft and organise themselves in co-operatives (kautasi fai laulafi). They sell their produce in special houses (fale). In the Alo district, for example, there are three handicraft fale in the village of Taa, one in Mala’e and four each in Ono and Kolia. The number of women varies per group. Some women prefer to work alone at home, as when they have small children, while nevertheless still selling their products through a fale; others prefer to co-operate with others also during the production process. For example, in 1985 Losa founded the co-operative Vaikinafa with 20 female members; most of them came from Losa’s own village, Ono, but there were some from Kolia. Ten years after its foundation, Losa built on her own village plot (kāiga) a handicraft fale for the co-operative. Through the village council she was able to mobilise a group of men to prepare wood and pandanus leaves for the roof. She also organised men to construct concrete floors and walls in exchange for food. The age of the 20 female members is between 14 and 60 years. The youngest members still attend school and make shell necklaces (kasoa figota). The other main goods produced by members of the co-operative are small, decorated pieces of tapa, handbags and wallets made from tapa and
wickerwork. In the beginning, two male wood carvers were also members of the co-operative. They carved *tapa* beaters, spears, kava bowls and food dishes, but after ten years, one of them became ill and the other’s electric tools broke down and this brought an end to their wood carving activities.

Losa herself works for the French administration (*ga’oi pule aga*). In order to avoid problems with her employer as well as to avoid gossip, she had her 25-year-old daughter Florence appointed as president, although everybody knows that Losa remains the driving force behind the co-operative. She developed a good financial and administrative insight in her salaried job, which helps with the management of the co-operative. Moreover, through her job she has access to a network of French clients. Losa never had a husband and is the only one with a salaried job on her *kāiga* village plot. Her daughter’s partner and her son cultivate taro and catch fish. Losa also is the head (*pule*) of her localised extended family (*kāiga*), and as a woman she is an exception in this respect. Of all the members of the co-operative, Losa and her daughter Florence sell the most—they are very productive and are able, for example, to decorate three pieces of *tapa* a day.

The co-operative has two sorts of clients: Futunans and Europeans or Wallisians. Futunans, who usually do not have money, pay with fish or agricultural products, such as manioc, coconuts and piglets. A basket of manioc (for pig feed), for example, is worth two shell necklaces (*kasoa figota*). The latter are much in demand as gifts given to arriving or departing family members or friends at the airstrip. This sort of payment in kind (barter) is called *totogi fakafutuna*, or is specified by the means of payment, e.g., *totogi manioke* ‘manioc payment’. In recent years, there have been more European residents (*papālagi*) on Futuna than there used to be, mainly French people who work at the high school (*collège*), in the post office, the national police (*gendarme*) or in the administration, and there are some tourists. These people pay with money (*totogi pa’aga* or *totogi fakapapālagi*). Wallis remains the major client, however, facilitated by the curiosity shop *Hehofe*, but there are also incidental buyers from New Caledonia, Fiji, Sāmoa and Tahiti.

Depending on the available material and the demand, the monthly turnover of the co-operative varies between 80,000 and 300,000 CFP (Losa pers. comm. 2001). Ten percent of the turnover goes into the cash reserve of the co-operative in order to pay overhead expenses such as electricity, painting, mowing the grass and the annual New Year’s presents for its members (a home-made cake and an envelope containing 10,000 CFP). Part of this money goes to the co-operative’s relief fund used, for example, for advances on air tickets. Up to now, however, the volume of sales remains unsatisfactory and this is also true for the other handicraft co-operatives on the island.
For this reason, the Territorial Council initiated the formation of federations (groupements d’initiatives économiques), one in Sigave and one in Alo. These federations are analogous to and co-operate with the federation on Wallis that already existed (Van der Grijp 2002:22, 24). The Sigave and the Alo federations each built a special fale with French government funding. The federations aim at centralising all sales by existing co-operatives, harmonising the prices of goods and stimulating export, particularly to Wallis and New Caledonia. At present, handicraft products are often too expensively priced and they compete poorly with those from neighbouring Fiji, Tonga and Sāmoa. Because there are so far no evident advantages for participants (besides political gain for the organisers), people lack motivation to participate in the federations, a reason why this Council initiative bodes to become yet another failed development project.

**CONFIGURATION OF SUBSISTENCE, BARTER AND GIFT ECONOMY**

From the point of view of economic anthropology, it would be nonsense to say “Futuna has an economy that lives in total self-sufficiency [autarcie totale]”, as Marc Soulé claims (1994:223; translation by the author). Compared to Wallis, salaried jobs are rare on Futuna, including government employment and commercial enterprises (see Table 2). Money remains relatively scarce on Futuna, even though there is some French development money that is directly handed over to and redistributed by the chiefs and some in-flow of money as remittances from relatives overseas (mainly in New Caledonia). Having said that, the monetary dimension of the social economy, including people’s dependency on money for their survival, is clearly present and increasing. A significant portion of salaries, remittances and other monetary revenues is invested in gift circulation and is thus redistributed among the population. There may be a high percentage of salaries on the island (see Table 2), although much lower than on Wallis, but most of these salaries are part of low household budgets.

Development projects that are parachuted from above into communities by political authorities, such as the market project and the (centralised) federations of handicraft groups, appear to fail. But projects such as the transport co-operatives (sosiete vaka) and the handicraft co-operatives (kautasi fai lautahi), where the initiative to form a co-operative is taken by the participants themselves, continue to operate with a certain degree of success and with enthusiasm on the part of their members. In the cases of the market and federations, the participants used government funding; in the cases of the transport and handicraft co-operatives, people raised the necessary funds themselves through gifting and feasting.
The economy in societies with frequent and dominant gift circulation, such as Futuna society, cannot be reduced to a “gift economy”, but is a combination, in fact a specific configuration, of subsistence, barter, gift and, at present also, monetary dimensions. By the same token, “subsistence economy” alone, i.e., without the complementary “gift economy”, is an incorrect identification, because subsistence activities are made possible within the framework of gift exchange networks, redistribution and circulation (see Sahlins 1972: Chapter 5, and the examples discussed below). For example, one system of consecutive redistribution in Futuna stimulates surplus production, i.e., producers produce more than is needed for their own domestic use. Hence the notions “subsistence economy” and “domestic mode of production” are inadequate.29

Another example in point are pigs and tapa: both are prestigious products of male and female work, respectively, and they are mainly consumed (or used, in the case of tapa) outside the producing household. Salaried persons may even buy these products.

The balance of giving and receiving usually is approximate and shifts in time (i.e., it is not simultaneous, but consecutive). But a balance is indeed kept. If a man gives a large pig for the First Holy Communion of the son of a cousin and a considerably smaller pig during a similar occasion for the son of his own brother, his brother will certainly notice it and take it into account in their subsequent exchanges—their exchange relationship changes. Relations of exchange may also be created, say between friends, or deliberately ended. If one’s neighbours do not participate in gift exchange during the funeral of one’s mother, one’s absence during a similar occasion in their family will be significant and noted. On Futuna, however, social control is so pervasive that this kind of dissident behaviour, acts of exception to the rule, remains rare, especially in the eastern district (Alo) compared to the western district (Sigave). In social terms, this kind of exceptional behaviour is associated with religious dissent, e.g., the Evangelical Church.

In some households the balance in gift circulation, with precise details about date, character of the occasion, as well as the kind and quantity of goods exchanged, is accounted for in notebooks for home economics. Domestic units (and localised extended families or kāiga) with several men and women in the productive age group usually give more than they receive, whereas domestic units (and kāiga) with many young children (or old or incapacitated members and thus fewer members in productive age or category) usually receive more than they give. Futunans consider this a form of social justice, to be compared with European and North American medical insurance or pension schemes. But unlike Western systems, Futuna gift circulation occurs in genuine public events, where generous givers acquire prestige, and people
thus tend to give more than was asked (e.g., by a chief). The presence of monetary means in the system of gift circulation produces a clear inflation in the gifts exchanged—e.g., buying even larger pigs with money earned elsewhere. From a Futunan point of view, gifting has a double motivation, positive as well as negative: one is proud (fia sa) to give and one would be ashamed (luma) not to give enough.

Salisbury (1968) and other economic anthropologists used to draw a distinction between ceremonial and non-ceremonial gift exchange. In the case of Futuna, this distinction is not always apposite, because within one’s kin group (kāiga), for example, both occur, and because the distinction between the two types of gifting is often vague. Moreover, we observe that not all gift circulation is mutual exchange. Individuals give to the society (or chiefdom) as a whole and expect an equivalent counter gift at some later time. An individual thus receives from persons other than those to whom he or she gives.

A brief comparison with European and North American medical insurance or pension schemes was mentioned above. This should not be seen as primitive communalism, an incorrect anthropological notion in vogue in the past. The goods thus circulated are also distributed in other ways: pigs, root crops, tapa, mats and turmeric may be gifted ceremonially, sold or consumed and used within one’s own household. We can only speak of true gift circulation in the case of durable (restricted or generalised) exchange and not in cases of a once-only gift without further repercussions. This leads me to the following theoretical observation. Marcel Mauss (1922-23) was correct in emphasising the social pressure exerted on the recipient of a gift, who is inferior (Latin minister) to the donor. The donor, in turn, would be superior (Latin magister), until the recipient offers an acceptable counter gift. This would not annihilate his debt completely, but place him in a superior position in relation to the previous donor, who is now the recipient. Such forms of asymmetrical ideology occur when gift circulation is limited to human beings. But, I contend, it does not apply in systems where the supernatural is implied, for example, in gifting to a chief whose authority is of a sacred character, because it derives from his divine (pre-Christian) ancestry. The prosperity of the land and its people is directly linked to the well-being of its chief who, thus, has to receive generous gifts.

A remarkable feature of contemporary gift circulation on Futuna is that almost all large gift ceremonies (katoaga) are focused on Roman Catholic religious events, such as the feasts of the patron saints of the different villages. In a previous publication (1993a:207-11), I developed a model of gifting ideology for neighbouring Tonga, the Free Wesleyan Methodist church and
its earthly representatives. In this model, the donors of material gifts start with a debt vis-à-vis the supernatural (the Christian god) on a symbolic level, which can only be compensated in part, but never completely paid off. In this ideological system, the church professionals only function as intermediaries, though they are at the same time the recipients of all the material gifts and redistribute some of them. In the case of the Methodist church they are, indeed, ministers to the Church, but not minister in the sense of Mauss’ gift theory. They are net receivers, but certainly not inferior (minister) in relation the donors.

Rather than reducing Futunan identity to that of other Polynesian people, however, one should define Futunan identity in its own terms, although Futunan society has much in common with other Polynesian societies, particularly its closer neighbours. The Futunan version of Polynesian identity consist of a specific socioeconomic, political and ideological system that—in common with other West Polynesian societies such as Wallis, Tonga, Sāmoa and Rotuma—may be defined as a configuration of the following four features: (i) a paramount chieftaincy and corresponding system of asymmetrical ideology based on the mana-tapu complex, (ii) the dominant role of cognatic kinship in the social relations of production, distribution and politics, (iii) a form of land tenure which is structured by principles of both chieftaincy and (cognatic) kinship, and (iv) a combined subsistence, barter and gift economy in which pigs, root crops, seafood, kava, mats, tapa and turmeric play a predominant part (Van der Grijp 2001, 2004). These four culture markers do not occur incidentally, but their very configuration shapes Futunan culture. Futunan cultural identity has both material dimensions (e.g., production) and ideational dimensions (ideas, values and norms). In spite of the changes that these culture markers have undergone throughout the course of history, including the processes of Christianisation (missionary colonisation), the intervention of the French state (neo-colonialism) and the monetarisation (globalisation) of aspects of the social economy as analysed in this article, they still form the heart of Futunan society today.

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NOTES

1. Archaeologically and linguistically speaking, Futuna is closely related to Sāmoa (Frimigacci 1990; Kirch 1994a, 1994b). According to Futunan oral tradition, Tongans, who had already settled on Wallis, undertook several expeditions to conquer Futuna, but these efforts were unsuccessful (Frimigacci et al. 1995:289-94, Huffer and Leleivai 2001).

2. In 1768, the French captain Bougainville of the Boudeuse and the Etoile sighted the island of Futuna and named it Enfant Perdu, but he never went ashore.

3. Pompallier left the priest Pierre Chanel on Futuna, who was followed shortly thereafter by other Catholic missionaries (Angleviel 1994, Chanel 1960). Pompallier wished to hasten the conversion of Wallis and Futuna because the British Wesleyan Methodists, who already had strongholds in Fiji, Tonga and Samoa, were eyeing them (Van der Grijp 1993b). Pompallier wrote, “I hurried to occupy these two islands, because I knew that heresy intended to capture them soon; I call myself lucky to have been able to outstrip them” (1838:72, translation by the author). According to the Wesleyan Methodist missionaries, however, the early Methodist mission on Wallis encountered problems with both “indigenous superstition” and the “opposition of Popery” (WMMS 1845:44). In 1845, the Methodists observed that the two Roman Catholic missionaries “use[d] their utmost influence in annoying our Native Teachers, and obstructing their work” (WMMS 1845:44). Pompallier thought that the “king” of Futuna would build a house for the Catholic mission, but was not aware of the fact that Futuna consisted of two rival chiefdoms. In 1841, the missionary Chanel was killed as a result of the power struggle between the two chiefdoms. In 1889, the Pope beatified and, in 1964, canonised Chanel.

4. This is also the case in other West Polynesian societies such as Wallis (Van der Grijp 2002, 2003), Tonga (Van der Grijp 1993a, 2004), Sāmoa (O’Meara 1990, Tcherkézoff 2003) and Rotuma (Howard 1964, Rensel 1994).

5. The Second World War, which had such an impact on Wallis because of the large contingent of American soldiers there, ran its course with little or no effect on Futuna. Almost all connections with the outside world were interrupted. At the time, most Futunans did not even know that a war was going on and only heard about it later.

6. Other anthropological studies on Futuna have been published in French (Decergy 2002, 2004; Douaire-Marsaudon 1998: Chs 10 and 11; Favole 2000a; Gaillot 1962; Panoff 1963, 1970: Part II; Rozier 1963; Viala 1919) and Italian (Favole 1999, 2000b). Nancy Pollock (1995) published a comparison of the power of kava on Wallis and Futuna in English. This short list does not include publications on archaeology, linguistics and oral tradition. For general information on Futuna (and Wallis), see Malau, Takasi and Angleviel 1999.

7. Also, in 1996, there were more women aged 20 years or more living on Futuna than men in the same age category, 115.4 women for 100 men (Cherri et al. 1997:9).
8. Most of these immigrants, also on Futuna, are French civil servants appointed to the territory for only three to four years (Cherri et al. 1997:14).

9. Similar criticism should be made when they state that Futuna women are “mainly occupied with domestic and subsistence tasks” (Cherri et al. 1997:22). This is incorrect since an important portion of bark cloth and mats these women produced is destined for gifting outside the household.

10. The chiefdom of Alo, for example, has the following high chiefs and village heads (in 2001): chief Tiafo‘i (in Taoa) assisted by village heads Sa‘atula and Fainumaumau, chief Sa‘atula (in Mala‘e) assisted by Safeitoga and Safeisau, chief Tu‘i Asoa (in Ono) assisted by Fainuvele and Mani‘ulua, chief Tu‘i Sa‘avaka (in Kolia) assisted by Fainuava and Fainumalava, and, finally, chief Vakalasi (on the island of Alofi) assisted only by Ma‘uifa.

11. Since the previous census of 1990, Alofi has been added as a village, although it has no residents. Some people actually live on Alofi, but none of these declared the island as their principal place of residence during the census (Cherri et al. 1997:6).

12. This kind of social duty is known as fatogia kāiga because the chief’s decision makes the (localised) kāiga as a whole responsible for the task. For a feast (katoaga) of the patron saint of the village, however, a fatogia kāiga would not be enough to feed all the participants. In this case, the chief and the village council may decide that there will be a fatogia tagata, which means that every man in the village has to make an earth oven as his contribution to the feast. The fatogia for women (fatogia fafine) has similar rules and concerns the production and presentation of tapa and mats. In her Futunan-French dictionary, Claire Moyse-Faurie (1993:136) gives the example of the expression e fatogia ai a fafine ki le lalaga o moelaga ‘the women are really obliged to weave mats’ (translation from the French by the author). According to the Sa‘atula (pers. comm. 2001), when he sees fit, the chief orders the women via the women’s village council to plant paper mulberry trees (tutu): “All women have to make a tutu plantation; in about one month I will come over to inspect them.” After his inspection, the women are free to use the product as they please, they may sell it or use it themselves since it is not the direct concern of the chief. In the tropical maritime climate of Futuna, tutu grows on most soil types. A problem is the recent abundance of a certain type of snail that eats the plant’s leaves and destroys it.

13. Traditional houses are open structures (as in Sāmoa): they do not have walls, but a floor and a roof supported by posts. When it rains, mats woven from the leaves of coconut palms are lowered on the windward side of the house.

14. For example, the title of the paramount chief, Tu‘i Sigave, circulates within the Safoka and Falema‘a ramage, and the title of the Tu‘i Agaifo within the Lalo Taoa and Talise Ono ramage.

15. According to one of the chiefs (Sa‘atula, pers. comm. 2001), all true Futunans belong to chiefly families and are thus aliki; only the descendants who immigrated to the island in the course of history do not, and they are thus seka.
16. In the chiefdom of Alo, for example, the patron saints’ feasts fall on the following days: Taa on 8 December (Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary) and for the corresponding hamlet Tuatafa on 29 December (the Holy Family); Mala’e on 29 September (the three archangels Michael, Raphael and Gabriel); Ono on 1 October (St Theresa) and for the corresponding hamlet Vele on 11 June (Holy Trinity); for the Ono-part of Alofi on 11 February (St Bernadette); Kolia on 28 April (St Pierre Chanel); (the remainder of) Alofi on 29 June (Sacred Heart).

17. The Evangelical Church is older than 1985 and has followers elsewhere in the world—in the South Pacific for example in New Caledonia—but these do not seem to have a direct link with Sepeli Tuikalepa and his Futuna converts.

18. The Roman Catholics also had a project to translate the bible into Futunan, but the Evangelical Church completed the translation first.

19. In 1996, 38.6 percent of Futunan households had a fridge, 34.8 percent a freezer, 41 percent a sewing machine and 52.6 percent a television, compared to 20.1 percent, 16 percent, 53.7 percent, and 12 percent respectively in 1990 (Cherri et al. 1997:45). This shows a rapid increase in the ownership of appliances—and a remarkable decrease of sewing machines. Washing machines were not recorded. This boom in ownership of domestic appliances was also stimulated by French aid following cyclone Radja in 1986 and a devastating earthquake in 1993. Many houses were destroyed and the aid was intended to rebuild them. A significant portion part of this money was used for the acquisition of electrical appliances, however, which are particularly popular after the recent completion of the power network (see note 24 and Van der Grijp 2003:283-84).

20. These young men may eat in the house of their parents during the day, but in the evening they gather together with adult men in the kava house (tauasu) and consume the typically Polynesian drink kava, made from the roots of the Piper methysticum (Rossille 1986). At night, they sleep with the other young, unmarried men in the fale uvō. One of the young men, usually the eldest, is chosen as their representative (pule uvō) and has to maintain contact with the village chief. One of the decisions a pule uvō has to make concerns the preparation of a collective plantation which provides the young men with their food.

21. In 1996, 72 percent of Futunan houses had concrete or stone walls, 64.6 percent a concrete floor and 40.3 percent a concrete or corrugated iron roof, compared to 56.7 percent, 40.9 percent and 30.6 percent respectively in 1990 (Cherri et al. 1997:42).

22. In 1996, 25 percent of households in the Alo district had an inside toilet, 99.2 percent had electricity and 25.5 percent were linked to the water mains, compared to 40.3 percent, 99.1 percent and 7.3 percent respectively in the Sigave district. In 1983, only 4.3 percent of Futunan households had an inside toilet, none had electricity and 7.3 percent were linked to the water mains (Cherri et al. 1997:43).

23. Burrows’ expression “eating together” is inadequate as a translation of kai-ga in other respects. Although the members of a Futunan household eat from the same kitchen and earth oven, they do not really eat together. Adolescent brothers and sisters often eat apart. When there are guests, either the parents only or only the father eat with the guests and other household members may only eat afterwards.
24. Compare the distinction on Tahiti between money work (‘ohipa moni) and farming work (‘ohipa fa’apu) and the further distinction between slow money (moni taere) from cash cropping and fast money (moni ‘oi’oi) from weekly salaries (Finney 1988:196-97). On Wallis, these distinctions almost match those on Futuna (Van der Grijp 2002:20), although on Wallis, the percentage of "salaried work in the European way" (gaue fakapapālagi) compared to "traditional" work (gaue fakafenua) is much higher than on Futuna.

25. In 1996, 21.7 percent of Futunan households owned a motor car compared to 15.8 percent in 1990 (Cherri et al. 1997:45). However, it is not clear how the collective ownership of cars through sosiete motoka was accounted for in the census. The ownership of cars on Wallis was considerably higher: 49.5 percent in 1996 compared to 32.1 percent in 1990.

26. The steering wheel in these trucks is on the right (in Fiji, a member of the Commonwealth, people drive on the left side of the road), but as several Futuna drivers assured me, “we have not been bothered by this until now.”

27. Vaikinafa is also the name of Losa’s agricultural plot in Alofi.

28. In January 2001, 1 CFP equaled 0.00838 Euro. The CFP, an abbreviation of cour franc pacifique, is also used in Wallis, New Caledonia and French Polynesia.

29. In Stone Age Economics, Sahlins (1972:75, 101) discusses the limits of the notion of domestic mode of production: “The domestic economy cannot be ‘seen’ in isolation, uncompromised by the greater institutions to which it is always subordinated…. It never really happens that the household by itself manages the economy, for by itself the domestic stranglehold on production could only arrange for the expiration of society.”

REFERENCES


